Using a sample of reverse leveraged buyout ('reverse-LBO') firms, I find that discretionary accruals quality (AQ), the quality of accruals that are subject to management discretion, significantly improves from pre-LBO to post-reverse LBO. Moreover, buyout houses' board seats and the length of firms' stay-in-private periods are significant explanatory variables for the cross-sectional variation in discretionary AQ for post-reverse-LBO firms. My findings suggest that the monitoring provided by private equity buyout houses improves discretionary AQ, consistent with the view of Jensen (1989a,b) that LBOs are a solution to inefficiencies that arise from agency problems.
Introduction
This article investigates the monitoring impact of buyout houses, the backers of reverse leveraged buyout ('reverse-LBO') firms, on reverse-LBO firms' discretionary accruals quality (AQ). Specifically, I examine how discretionary AQ (as measured by Francis et al., 2005) changes from pre-LBO to post-reverse LBO.
Theory suggests that monitoring by buyout houses mitigates agency problems, thereby improving discretionary AQ subsequent to a reverse LBO. Using a partly hand-collected data set of 351 reverse-LBO firms, I find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. Moreover, I find that the length of the stay-in-private period and the percentage of board seats held by buyout houses significantly explain the cross-sectional variation in reverse-LBO firms' discretionary AQ. Overall, the evidence supports the argument put forth by Jensen (1989a,b) that 'active investors' serve as effective monitors by curbing opportunistic managerial behaviour, thereby enhancing shareholder value.
It is only recently that the accounting aspects of LBOs and reverse LBOs have become the subject of academic investigation. An example of such studies is Katz (2009) using a unique sample of private firms that later undertook initial public offerings ('IPOs'). He finds that IPO firms that were backed by buyout houses engage in less upward earnings management and are more likely to recognize losses in a timely fashion, both pre-IPO and post-IPO, than firms that are not backed by buyout houses but that are instead majority-owned by management. Katz (2009) concludes from his findings that the better earnings quality is attributable to the tighter monitoring and reputation considerations of buyout sponsors. In a related finance study, Cao and Lerner (2009) examine the 3-and 5-year stock performance of reverse LBOs and find that reverse LBOs outperform other IPOs as well as the stock market as a whole.
My article extends this LBO and reverse LBO research and makes contributions along several dimensions. First, I relate the monitoring role of buyout houses in reverse-LBO firms' earnings quality to Jensen's agency theory and its associated 'active investor' argument. Although Jensen (1989a,b) first suggested that LBOs were a solution to the inefficiencies arising from agency problems, the studies of Katz (2009) and Cao and Lerner (2009) ignore the agency issues in the LBO setting and focus primarily upon buyout houses' reputational concerns stemming from their being 'repeated players' in the market. Although these latter concerns are undoubtedly important, they are fairly generic to most settings. A distinguishing feature of LBO target firms, however, is that they are not chosen randomly, but rather tend to be firms with severe agency problems and significant locked values. My discretionary accruals study is sensitive to the agency issues underlying LBOs and thereby unites the literature related to earnings quality, LBOs and agency theory.
My study makes a second contribution towards understanding determinants of earnings quality in a particular LBO setting. Prior literature (Dechow et al., 2009 ) documents six categories of determinants: (i) firm characteristics, (ii) financial reporting practices, (iii) governance and controls, (iv) auditors, (v) equity market incentives and (vi) external factors. When it comes to specific research, one has to consider the context of the study and correspondingly chooses which determinants to be investigated. As LBO target firms tend to have severe agency problems, it is natural to focus on governance and control variables in determining those firms' earnings quality. The specific contribution of this article is to document that two factors, stay-in-private period length and the percentage of board seats held by buyout houses, provide incremental power beyond the traditional proxies for monitoring in explaining the cross-sectional variation in discretionary AQ. This finding is particularly interesting, given that the buyout houses have been criticized for 'flipping' their portfolio companies and making quick profits.
My study also offers several refinements in empirical design relative to the prior literature. First, in terms of measuring financial reporting quality, this article focuses on discretionary AQ, as opposed to discretionary accruals and asymmetric timeliness as in Katz (2009) . In their extensive review of the earnings quality literature, Dechow et al. (2009) argue (in their abstract) that 'Over the years, researchers have devised various measures of ''earnings quality'' to represent decision usefulness in specific decision contexts. These measures, however, have become proxies for ''earnings quality'' in a generic sense, absent a decision context. The result is that some papers use a proxy for earnings quality that does not match the hypothesized form of decision usefulness in their study'. I follow the suggestion of Dechow et al. (2009) by adopting a proxy for earnings quality that matches the decision context under study. Specifically, I choose discretionary AQ because there is a documented cost of capital effect associated with this measure. A second innovative design feature of this study is its strategic choice of timeframe for LBO sample firms, leading to both a more constructively valid benchmark and the minimization of sample selection bias. In choosing the firms with which he will benchmark his private equity (PE)-backed sample, for example, Katz (2009) uses non-PE-backed companies. This approach could be problematic as private equity firms do not choose their targets on a random basis. Rather, PE-backed firms are typically fundamentally different from non-PE-backed firms even before they were bought out. Hence, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to use the non-PE-backed firms as benchmarks. Another drawback of Katz (2009) is that to overcome the difficulty of data availability, he restricts his sample to include only firms with pre-IPO public debt. This imposes bias and it is unclear how this bias might affect the generalization of his results. My article adopts a different approach, where comparison is made between pre-LBO and post-reverse LBO for a group of LBO target firms. Not only do I not need to use non-PEbacked firms as benchmarks, which is questionable, but I also have data readily available for my sample firms as the companies were public during both periods.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes LBO and reverse LBO activities. Section 3 reviews the literature and develops hypotheses. Section 4 presents data, while Section 5 describes testing methodologies and reports the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
LBO and reverse LBO
Leveraged buyout partnerships consist of a General Partner (GP) and Limited Partners (LP). The private equity firm (such as KKR and Blackstone) serves as GP. Institutional investors and wealthy individuals commit the bulk of the capital and become LPs. Leveraged buyout houses often first identify targets, and then buy out the firm or a division of the firm (i.e. a divestiture) using leverage. After taking the firm private, the buyout houses often push for a reorganization to potentially add value to the firm, and then cash out either partially or fully. One major channel of exit is via an IPO. For firms that have previously been subject to LBO, this is often referred to as a reverse LBO or LBO-backed IPO. Kaplan (1991) reports that 45 per cent of a sample of large LBOs completed between 1979 and 1986 later returned to public ownership. My hand-collected data 1 gives me 1240 buyout-backed IPOs. Hence, we have at least 21.5 per cent of LBO deals, which eventually took the reverse LBO exit channel.
2 Intuitively, larger deals are more likely to choose IPO rather than sale to a third party as the exit form because of transaction cost and illiquidity argument. Plus, the public market is preferred to a strategic buyer, ceteris paribus, because usually the seller would get a higher multiple in the public equity market. To conclude, the reverse LBO is a very important channel for the buyout house to exit and gain liquidity. Leveraged buyout activities started gaining momentum in the late 1970s and prospered in the late 1980s. They cooled down in 1990s as the stock market flourished, and then made a very strong comeback in the first half of the 2000s. At the time of writing this article, LBO activities have significantly diminished because of the deterioration of the credit markets that are so vital to LBO activities. Table 1 reports LBO activities across the years before the current meltdown of the credit markets.
Panel A replicates the Table 1 from Jensen (1989a) and clearly shows that LBO activity was trivial before the early 1980s but quickly became a very significant event in the second half of that decade. At its peak in 1988 and 1989, LBO transactions accounted for almost a quarter of the whole US M & A market's deal value (as shown in Panel B of Table 1 ). Panel B uses a different source of data to show LBO activities over a much longer period .
3 As shown, LBO activities steadily waned in the 1990s, reaching bottom in the late 1990s when the stock market soared. This is not surprising because private equity is an alternative investment to the stock market. When the bear market started in the Jensen (1989b) views the emergence of LBOs as a solution to the inefficiency arising from agency problems. He claims that the lack of effective monitoring of corporate managers in public companies destroys value. Typical independent directors who supposedly represent shareholders do a poor job in curbing managements' opportunistic and value-destroying behaviour, such as empire-building in companies with abundant free cash flow. Leveraged buyout specialists come into play as 'active investor' to remedy the problem of managerial value destruction. In contrast to the usual outside directors who have little or no equity interest in the firm, buyout houses own an average of 60 per cent of the firm's equity and therefore they are highly motivated to take the monitoring job seriously. Jensen (1989a,b) concludes that LBO activities enhance value.
Literature review and hypothesis development

Earnings quality
Starting from Lev (1989) , the concept of earnings quality has become a topic of enormous interest to academics. Lev (1989) first defines earnings quality as decision usefulness in the context of equity valuation. Since then, the term of earnings quality has been extended to other contexts as well. 4 In their extensive literature review related to earnings quality, Dechow et al. (2009) criticize that many researchers view those various proxies for 'earnings quality' in a generic sense and therefore often mistakenly use a proxy for earnings quality that does not match the hypothesized form of decision usefulness in their studies. They argue convincingly that 'earnings quality' is meaningless unless its specific decision context is carefully discussed. A very important dimension of earnings quality, which is most relevant in my study, relates to the quality of accruals.
5 Dechow and Dichev (2002) (hereafter 'DD') measure AQ by mapping accruals into cash flows and suggest that a weak mapping implies poor AQ. They derive an empirical measure of accrual quality as the residuals from firm-specific regressions of changes in working capital on past, present and future operating cash flows. Francis et al. (2005) use DD's model to investigate whether investors price AQ. They find that poorer AQ is associated with larger costs of debt and equity. Francis et al. (2005) try to explain this by arguing that AQ is a proxy for information risk, which is not diversifiable, and hence AQ enters into pricing. Francis et al. (2005) also distinguish between innate AQ (i.e. that which is driven by economic fundamentals, such as firm size, variability of operations, length of operating cycle and loss incidence) and discretionary AQ (i.e. that which derives from managerial choice).
There also exists a large amount of literature related to the determinants of earnings quality. Dechow et al. (2009) review about 350 published articles across the top five accounting journals and summarize six categories of determinants: (i) firm characteristics, (ii) financial reporting practices, (iii) governance and controls, (iv) auditors, (v) equity market incentives and (vi) external factors. A similar implication applies to the determinants of earnings quality; one has to consider context in deciding which factors are the relevant determinants of a particular 'earnings quality' proxy. For instance, Dechow et al. (2009) argue that 'We are not aware of papers that specifically analyse the role of growth, as a determinant of timely loss recognition. Researchers have, however, examined growth as a determinant of the external indicators of quality. AAER firms have high market to book ratios and high accruals during manipulation years ' (p. 82) . This indicates that, in explaining cross-sectional variation of a particular proxy of earnings quality, researchers need to consider which of the above six categories of determinants are relevant. Out of the above six categories of determinants, financial reporting practices turns out to be the weakest one as evidenced by the very few articles in this category. Dechow et al. (2009) attribute this lack of evidence to the endogeneity problem, which makes it very hard to establish any causal link. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs arise when there is a conflict of interest between principals and their agents. One notable agency problem 5 Detailed discussions on the other proxies can be found in Dechow et al. (2009) , and Dechow and Schrand (2004) . Here, I focus on AQ, which is the most relevant in the context of this paper.
Agency theory and active investor literature
is the 'empire building' associated with free cash flows (Jensen, 1986) . Free cash flow is defined as the excess cash flow available after the firm has financed all of its positive net present value ('NPV') projects. A manager who maximizes shareholder value should disgorge free cash flow to shareholders rather than keep them in the firm and invest in value-destroying projects. However, because of conflicts of interest, managers may be motivated to use the excess free cash flows to build their own empires, meaning to grow the firm beyond the optimal size to benefit themselves at shareholders' expense. The private benefits that a manager can extract from 'empire building' include at least the following: increased power because of more resources under her control, better compensation associated with bigger firm size, more perks and social fame. To mitigate this particular agency problem, one solution is to use more debt financing (without retaining the proceeds in the firm) so that managers commit their future free cash flows to the payment of interest on debt (which is mandatory by the debt contracts), which thereby reduces the amount of free cash flow available to managers. Jensen (1986) further argues that this debt creation is an effective substitute for dividends to address the 'empire building' problem. Hence, agency-cost-minimizing contracts would imply that a firm with severe free cash flow problems tends to have more debt and less equity in its capital structure (Smith and Watts, 1992) .
The firms subject to free cash flow problems are most likely to be those mature firms with stable cash flows and few growth opportunities. Jensen (1986) points out that firms with such characteristics are desirable LBO targets. In the absence of buyout activities, the agency costs of free cash flow tend to be high because of the 'empire building' incentive of self-interested managers and lack of effective monitoring from a typical corporate board. Most institutional investors are 'passive' in the sense that if they are not happy with management, there is little they can do but to sell shares. Moreover, typical 'independent' board members do a poor job of monitoring management because of their low equity holdings. The absence of effective monitoring tends to result in large value losses such that external 'active investors' seize the opportunity to control the company and recapture the lost value. Jensen (1989b) describes 'active investors' as follows: 'By active investor I don't mean one who indulges in portfolio churning. I mean an investor who actually monitors management, sits on boards, is sometimes involved in dismissing management, is often intimately involved in the strategic direction of the company, and on occasion even manages. That description fits Carl Icahn, Irwin Jacobs, and KKR' (p. 36). Jensen (1989b) further argues that LBO houses typically own 60 per cent of their portfolio company's equity and hence have strong incentives to be a serious monitor. In addition, buyout houses typically give a large equity stake to management after they take control of the company. Kaplan (1988) documented that the average chief executive officer (CEO) of a buyout house portfolio company receives $64 per $1000 change in shareholder wealth as opposed to a typical CEO of Forbes 1000 firms who only receives $3.5 per $1000 change in shareholder wealth. The incentives of LBO firm CEOs are therefore more in line with shareholders, and accordingly, they should be less inclined to engage in extracting private benefits.
Major hypotheses
My first hypothesis links the two bodies of literature discussed previously in a particular LBO and reverse-LBO setting and predicts that the part of earnings quality determined by managerial discretion will improve from pre-LBO to postreverse LBO because of the effective monitoring role of 'active investor' buyout houses. However, the term 'earnings quality' here is not a generic term but rather refers only to discretionary AQ.
I concentrate on discretionary AQ rather than total AQ because a large component of AQ is because of business fundamentals and hence, by definition, has nothing to do with managerial discretion. Because the monitoring role of buyout houses only has an effect on managerial discretion, discretionary AQ is the right metric to test empirically. More importantly, a logical story exists to support the hypothesis based upon this particular measure of earnings quality. There is no similar line of reasoning to support other earnings quality metrics and hence I refrain from claiming that all measures of earnings quality will improve from pre-LBO to post-reverse LBO. This is consistent with the caution made in Dechow et al. (2009) that researchers should be careful in linking the right proxy for earnings quality to their specific context.
My argument goes as follows: Jensen (1989a) predicts that firms who become the targets of LBO tend to have fewer growth opportunities and more severe free cash flow problems. We may build on Jensen's insight and conjecture that the reverse LBO is indicative of a shift in the investment opportunity set towards one with more growth options. 6 We thus may predict a shift of financing policy towards one with less debt and more equity (Smith and Watts, 1992) . That is to say, after the reverse LBO, both debt and equity financing are essential for reverse-LBO firms.
7 As a poorer AQ may lead to a higher cost of both equity and debt (Francis et al., 2005) 8 and it destroys shareholder value, buyout firms 6 During the stay-in-private period, LBO houses first unlock values, then often times push a change to transform the company towards more growth opportunities. Jeff Immelt, CEO of GE, states that 'We don't buy growth, we grow what we buy', and this same philosophy is especially true for buyout houses. Untabulated results for my sample firms show that market-to-book equity (assets) goes from 2.599 (1.860) in the pre-LBO period to 3.684 (2.402) in the post-reverse-LBO period, and the p-value of testing the null hypothesis of no difference is 0.0058 (0.0538).
7 Debt financing by far dominates equity financing in importance prior to reverse LBO. After the reverse LBO, there is a swap between equity and debt, meaning both play important roles in corporate financing.
will be 'active investors' and may monitor managements' behaviour to curb managerial discretion over destroying discretionary AQ. Hence, we have:
H1: Discretionary AQ increases in the post-reverse-LBO period as a result of buyout firms' active investor role in monitoring managements' opportunistic behaviour.
My second hypothesis aims at explaining the cross-sectional variation in earnings quality (using discretionary AQ as a proxy) across post-reverse-LBO firms. This relates to the extensive literature on the six determinants of earnings quality summarized by Dechow et al. (2009) . Of these six, effective monitoring (governance and controls) is hypothesized to be the major deterrent of managers' opportunistic behaviour in financial reporting in our particular agency problem-centred LBO setting, leading to the following hypothesis:
H2: Buyout houses' monitoring effectiveness will incrementally explain the crosssectional variation in discretionary AQ among reverse-LBO firms, after controlling for other relevant determinants of earnings quality.
Sample identification and data description
I start with the SDC database to look for reverse LBOs; however, the coverage of this database is rather incomplete. Given the incompleteness of the SDC database, I supplement this data with hand collection of sample firms. First, I refer to Mergers and Acquisitions magazine. For each year between 1987 and 1999, in its November-December issue, the magazine prints a list of reverse-LBO firms that went public during the year. Use of this source significantly expands my buyout-backed IPO sample, but with two drawbacks: first, the journal stopped providing the information after 1999; and second, the list does not have LBO effective dates.
I augment the SDC-and magazine-sourced lists by searching the media via Factiva and by visiting buyout houses' websites to complete the data as much as possible. This process yields a total of 1240 buyout-backed IPOs, with 704 of these having valid LBO effective dates. Table 2 reports the frequency distribution, average IPO size and average number of days in the staying-in-private period of these reverse LBOs across the years. It is evident that the average reverse-LBO IPO size has increased in recent years and that, on average, LBO firms stay in private about three and a half years before they return to the public equity market.
For the 704 reverse-LBO firms for which I am able to identify LBO effective dates, I use iperm to find their coverage in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged industrial annual file. I include only those firms with at least seven yearly observations either before their LBO effective date or after their IPO date.
9 This leaves 351 unique firms for the final sample, with 131 coming from the pre-LBO period and 278 from the post-IPO period. Fifty-eight firms are represented in both periods.
Testing methodologies and major findings
5.1. Measuring discretionary AQ 5.1.1. Accruals quality Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop a model of AQ by measuring the extent to which current accruals map into operating cash flows in the current period, prior period and future period. Non-current accruals are excluded because of the long lags between non-current accruals and cash-flow realizations. The residuals from regressing current accruals on cash flows from operations reflect the accruals that are not explained by cash flows, and the variation of these residuals gives a firmlevel inverse measure of AQ, i.e. a higher standard deviation of residuals implies poorer quality.
McNichols (2002) augments the DD model by introducing the fundamental variables from the modified Jones model (Jones, 1991 and Dechow et al., 1995) . Building on this combined model, Francis et al. (2005) construct their AQ metric by first running the following industry-year-specific cross-sectional regression for each Fama and French's (1997) 48 industries with at least 20 firms in year t.
where TCA j,t = DCA j,t ) DCL j,t ) DCash j,t + DSTDEBT j,t = total current accruals in year t, CFO j,t = NIBE j,t ) TA j,t = firm j's cash flow from operations in year t, NIBE j,t = firm j's net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t. TA j,t = (DCA j,t ) DCL j,t ) DCash j,t + DSTDEBT j,t ) DEPN j,t ) = firm j's total accruals in year t, DCA j,t = firm j's change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year t ) 1 and t, DCL j,t = firm j's change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t ) 1 and t, DCash j,t = firm j's change in cash (Compustat #1) between year t ) 1 and t, DSTDEBT j,t = firm j's change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34) between year t ) 1 and t, DEPN j,t = firm j's depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t, DRev j,t firm j's change in revenues (Compustat #12) between year t ) 1 and t, PPE j,t = firm j's gross value of PPE (Compustat #7) in year t. Estimation of equation (1) produces industry-year-specific coefficients that in turn yield firm-year-specific residuals e j,t , AQ j,t then is defined as the standard deviation of firm j's residuals, r(e j ) t , where r is calculated over years t ) 4 through t. 
Discretionary AQ
The essential role of accruals is to make adjustments to cash flows over time so that the adjusted numbers (earnings) better measure firm performance. Dechow (1994) documents that cash flows suffer from timing and matching problems that reduce their ability to reflect firm performance. Accruals mitigate those problems, especially in the shorter performance measurement interval, for the firms with greater volatility in working capital requirements and investment and financing activities and with longer operating cycles. However, this benefit comes with cost. As accruals require assumptions and estimations, the estimation error is introduced, with bigger error leading to poorer AQ.
There are two sources of estimation errors in accruals. Palepu et al. (2000) consider estimation errors as a factor that reduces accounting quality and argues that estimation precision depends on firm characteristics such as complexity of transactions and predictability of the firm's environment. In developing this intuition into a practical measure of accrual and earnings quality, Dechow and Dichev (2002) identify five innate factors as relevant to AQ: firm size, standard deviation of cash flow from operations, standard deviation of sales, length of operating cycle, and incidence of negative earnings realizations. They find that smaller firms, firms with greater cash-flow volatility, longer operating cycles and a greater incidence of losses have poorer AQ. In this article, I follow Francis et al. (2005) and measure each of these summary indicators on a firm-specific basis, using rolling 10-year windows (require at least five observations in each window). The innate factors affect AQ in an important way because their impact is likely to be systematic and recurring.
The second source of estimation error in accruals is intentional error (as opposed to unintentional error caused by innate factors) because of managements' opportunistic manipulation of accruals to serve their own interest. A number of studies document various motives of earnings management.
11 It is worth noting that the determinants of managerial opportunism are often viewed as sporadic as opposed to recurring innate factors. Dechow and Dichev (2002) do not disentangle 'intentional' estimation errors from unintentional errors in an empirical way. Francis et al. (2005) propose the following approach to decompose AQ into AQ driven by economic fundamentals (innate AQ) versus management choices (discretionary AQ). First, they run annual regression of equation (2): 10 Therefore, this AQ metric requires seven yearly observations. 11 For various incentives of earnings management, see Dechow and Schrand (2004) . AQ j;t ¼ q 0 þ q 1 SIZE j;t þ q 2 rðCFOÞ j;t þ q 3 rðSalesÞ j;t þ q 4 OperCycle j;t þ q 5 NegEarn j;t þ l j;t ð2Þ
where r(CFO) j,t is the standard deviation of firm j's Cash Flow from Operations (CFO), calculated over the past 10 years. r(Sales) j,t is the standard deviation of firm j's sales, calculated over the past 10 years. OperCycle j,t is the log of firm j's operating cycle, NegEarn j,t is the number of negative NIBE years out of the past 10 years.
The fitted values from equation (2) produces an estimate of innate AQ in year t, i.e.
Innate AQ j;t ¼q 0 þq 1 SIZE j;t þq 2 rðCFOÞ j;t þq 3 rðSalesÞ j;t þq 4 OperCycle j;t þq 5 NegEarn j;t ð3Þ
Naturally, discretionary AQ equals the residual from equation (2), i.e. Disc AQ j:t ¼l j:t :
Hypotheses tests
I use all the firm-years in the Compustat database to estimate equation (1) for each of Fama and French's (1997) 48 industry groups having at least 20 firms in year t. Industry-year-specific coefficients yield fitted values and residuals for each firm-year associated with the 351 unique firms in the final sample. The AQ measure, AQ j = r(e j,t ), is the standard deviation of firm j's residuals calculated over all of the available years. For the 58 firms that are represented in both the pre-LBO and post-reverse-LBO samples, I calculate their AQ measure for each of two periods separately. Because of the preset data restriction of a minimum of 7 years of data, the AQ measure is a standard deviation of at least five residuals.
I first compare pre-LBO to post-reverse-LBO AQ using a t-test for differences in the means of two independent samples, where the null is no difference between the means. Specifically, I exclude the 58 overlapping firms from the 278 post-reverse-LBO group, leaving 220 firms in the post-reverse-LBO group and 131 firms in the pre-LBO group. Panel A of Table 3 shows that the mean AQ for the 131 pre-LBO firms is 0.0499, while the mean AQ for the 220 post-reverse-LBO firms is 0.0660, with a difference of 0.0161 that is significantly different from zero at 0.03 per cent level. Panel B of Table 3 uses a paired comparisons test on the 58 overlapping firms to test the null hypothesis that the mean of the paired difference is zero. As shown, the mean of AQ difference is 0.0223 for the 58 constant sample and is significantly different from zero at less than 0.0001 level. The results in Table 3 support the notion that total AQ deteriorates significantly from pre-LBO to post-reverse-LBO period.
I next decompose total AQ into its two components, innate AQ and discretionary AQ, and examine how the composition of total AQ changes from pre-LBO to post-reverse LBO. Hypothesis one predicts that discretionary AQ will improve. Given the previous finding that total AQ deteriorates, for H1 to hold, innate AQ must not only deteriorate but the magnitude of this deterioration must also be sufficient to dominate the improvement in discretionary accruals.
I follow Francis et al. (2005) , using the entire CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged annual industrial file to run annual cross-sectional regressions of equation (2) to extract coefficient estimates. For purposes of these regressions, I measure r(CFO) and r(Sales) on a firm-specific basis using 10-year rolling windows, requiring at least five observations in each window. For each firm-year associated with the 351 final sample firms for which the data requirements have been met, I calculate the fitted values and residuals from equation (2), with the fitted values representing innate AQ and the residuals representing discretionary AQ. This leaves me with 843 firm-years (73 firms) from the pre-LBO period and 700 firm-years (160 firms) from the post-reverse-LBO period, with 33 firms overlapping the two periods. The data source for Panel A and Panel B starts from the 351 reverse LBOs that have identifiable LBO effective dates and initial public offering dates and at least seven yearly observations either before LBO or after reverse LBO or both. I get 131 firms before LBO and 278 firms after reverse LBO. These two samples have an overlapping 58 firms. Panel A uses independent sample and compares the mean between 131 pre-LBO firms and 220 post-reverse-LBO firms (i.e. I exclude 58 overlapping samples from post-reverse-LBO sample). Panel B uses constant sample (i.e. the 58 overlapping firms) and tests whether the mean of the paired difference is zero. Firm-specific AQ is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (1), and the coefficients of equation (1) come from the industryyear-specific cross-sectional regression of equation (1) on the whole CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged annual industry file. Cash flow from operations in equation (1) is derived by using indirect method. As robustness check, I also only use post-1988 direct cash-flow data to check the results, which remain intact. LBO, leveraged buyout. Table 4 shows the mean AQ, innate AQ and discretionary AQ across the pre-LBO and post-reverse-LBO groups, respectively, and tests the null hypothesis of no difference between each of the three means across the two groups. The results demonstrate that average AQ deteriorates from 0.0292 in the pre-LBO period to 0.0577 in the post-reverse-LBO period, which is qualitatively consistent with the results reported in Table 3 . Moreover, the average innate AQ declines from 0.0268 in the pre-LBO period to 0.0562 in the post-reverse-LBO period, while average discretionary AQ improves from 0.0012 in the pre-LBO period to 0.0006 in the post-reverse-LBO period. The difference is very significant (p-value <0.0001) for AQ and innate AQ and less dramatic but reasonably statistically significant (p-value = 0.032) for discretionary AQ. Table 4 shows that the discretionary AQ increases and the innate AQ decreases in the post-reverse-LBO period, all consistent with H1. The former result is consistent with the notion that buyout houses act as 'active investors' to monitor managements' opportunistic behaviour in producing accounting numbers, while the latter finding reflects the possible impact of the change in the investment opportunity set on AQ. Tables 3 and 4 also confirm that the total AQ decreases in the post-reverse-LBO period, suggesting that business fundamentals have the first-order effect in determining AQ.
H2 extends H1 in the sense that it predicts that the degree of buyout houses' monitoring effectiveness should explain cross-sectional variation in discretionary AQ for post-reverse-LBO firms. To empirically test H2, it is necessary to identify two key sets of variables: (i) proxies for buyout houses' monitoring effectiveness; Francis et al. (2005) and first use the whole CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged annual industrial file to run annual cross-sectional regression on equation (2) to get the coefficient estimates, where I measure r(CFO) and r(Sales) on a firm-specific basis, using rolling 10-year windows and require at least five observations in each window. Then, for each firm-year associated with the 351 final sample firms, if possible, I calculate the fitted values and residuals from equation (2) and record the fitted value as innate AQ and the residual as discretionary AQ. In the end, I have 843 firm-years representing 73 firms in pre-LBO period and 700 firm-years representing 160 firms in post-reverse-LBO period. And the two periods have an overlapping 33 firms. LBO, leveraged buyout.
and (ii) appropriate control variables that are known to affect discretionary AQ, particularly in an LBO setting. From Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 1989a , we know that our sample firms tend to have the most severe agency problems. Hence, out of the six categories of earnings quality determinants, corporate governance and control variables, along with auditors, are likely to be the right candidates for control variables. Moreover, as discussed earlier, firm characteristics are part of innate AQ and therefore there is no need to control for this in analysing discretionary AQ. Regarding the other determinants, financial reporting practices are considered to be unimportant (Dechow et al., 2009) , and equity market incentives and external factors are not applicable in our setting. Therefore, the research design involves regressing the level of discretionary AQ on proxies for buyout houses' monitoring intensity while also controlling for conventional proxies for general board and auditor monitoring effectiveness.
In particular, I follow Dikolli et al. (2009) and use four variables to represent general board monitoring intensity, including a dummy variable to specify whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board; the percentage of independent directors on the board; the size of the board of directors; and the percentage of the firm's shares owned by the board. I also include the G-index as an additional control variable to measure the quality of corporate governance as in Gompers et al. (2003) . Our major variables of interest are two proxies for buyout houses' monitoring effort: the percentage of board seats held by buyout houses; and the length of the stay-in-private period of reverse-LBO firms. The percentage of buyout houses' board seats is a proxy for buyout houses' equity holdings and also directly represents the buyout houses' voting power. Accordingly, it is a direct measure of buyout houses' monitoring effort. The rationale for using the stay-in-private periods as another measure of monitoring effort is that longer holding periods are indicative of more complicated situations in terms of the buyout houses' restructuring of the firms and their unlocking of values. In such difficult situations, there is a greater need for continuing mentorship and monitoring from the buyout house in order for the firm to do well post-reverse LBO. Hence, a longer stay-in-private period may justify the need for a stronger monitoring role on the part of the buyout house even after reverse LBO.
Starting with the 700 firm-years representing 160 unique firms from the postreverse-LBO period for which we have a discretionary AQ measure, I use ticker symbols to match the observations into the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) director and governance database. The IRRC provides a source of conventional proxies for general board monitoring intensity. As the IRRC database only covers 8 years of data: 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006 , we have a significant reduction in sample because of missing years and missing values. After merging with IRRC, the sample size is sharply reduced to 85 firm-years representing 39 unique firms. For each of these 85 firm-years, I hand collect the percentage of board seats held by buyout houses, by going to each firm-year's proxy statement.
I regress discretionary AQ onto the two sets of proxies for monitoring intensity, the conventional proxies as well as proxies to represent buyout houses' monitoring effort. Table 5 reports these ordinary least squared (OLS) regression results.
12 Consistent with H2, the results show that more intensive monitoring by buyout houses, measured either by a higher percentage of board seats or by longer stay-in-private periods, is associated with better discretionary AQ for reverse-LBO firms. The impact of buyout houses' monitoring intensity on discretionary AQ is both statistically and economically significant, even after controlling for conventional proxies for general board monitoring intensity. It is also worth noting that out of the conventional monitoring intensity proxies, only board size and the indicator for CEOs having a dual chairman role are significant. The board size variable carries its expected positive (and significant) coefficient, suggesting that bigger boards have more severe 'free-rider' problems, resulting in weaker overall monitoring. The negative coefficient on the Table 5 OLS regression relating monitoring intensity to discretionary accruals quality (AQ) Dependent variable = discretionary AQ Disc AQ ¼ a 0 þ a 1 Ã per buyout board þ a 2 Ã years private þ a 3 Ã gindex þ a 4 Ã board size þ a 5 Ã CEO not chairman þ a 6 Ã board holding þ a 7 Ã per indep The regression is based on 85 firm-years representing 39 unique firms in post-reverse leveraged buyout (LBO) period. per_buyout_board, the percentage of board seats held by buyout house; years_private, the stay-in-private period length of reverse-LBO firm; gindex, IRRC corporate governance index; board_size, the number of directors on the board; CEO_not_chairman, dummy that takes value of one if CEO is not chairman, zero otherwise; board_holding, percentage of stock held by the board directors, excluding CEO; per_indep, percentage of independent directors on the board.
CEO_not_chairman variable implies that the separation of the CEO and chairman's position improves monitoring effectiveness and is associated with better discretionary AQ. Consistent with the view of Jensen (1989a,b) that independent board members may fail to fulfil their monitoring responsibilities because of trivial levels of equity ownership, the percentage of independent directors variable is insignificant. Both gindex, which is often considered to be a noisy measure, and board_holding, which represents the equity percentage interest of non-CEO directors, are also insignificant.
Conclusions
I find that discretionary AQ (i.e. the part of AQ determined by management discretion) significantly improves from pre-LBO to post-reverse-LBO. Moreover, buyout houses' board seats and the length of the stay-in-private period significantly explain the cross-sectional variation in discretionary AQ for post-reverse-LBO firms. My findings suggest that private equity buyout houses' monitoring role improves financial reporting quality and enhances shareholder value, consistent with Jensen's (1989a,b) view that LBOs are a solution to the inefficiencies arising from agency problems.
My study is subject to two limitations. First, the sample size (especially for testing H2) is relatively small. Second, although I use state-of-the-art control variables for corporate governance and monitoring effectiveness, these variables carry noises and hence the results may be subject to a potential correlated omitted variables concern.
